Bahrain Re-Opens to (Pseudo-) Academics

Since I'm often compelled here to be the bearer of bad news, today I am happy to report a very positive development indeed, one certain to be welcome to everyone interested in Bahraini politics: the country is now reopen to academic research, even on the most sensitive of subjects. Apparently this decision was taken quite recently, as it was only three weeks ago that I received an e-mail from a researcher having just been barred entry into Bahrain for being "a journalist." But no matter, for we have already an example of the sort of work we can expect moving forward, namely a new empirical study (full .pdf here) of Bahrain's sectarian demographics by one Mitchell A. Belfer, which summarizes "the results of some eighteen months of field research in Bahrain."

If that name Belfer rings a bell, it should.  He is the author of an equally impressive work published last year by his Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, among the flagship publications of the Metropolitan University Prague (est. 2001), titled "The Fourteenth Province: The Irano-Bahraini Conflict in Perspective." This was subsequently parlayed into a Wall Street Journal op-ed of equal rhetorical vigor.

Continuing with the martial theme of the great "Irano-Bahraini Conflict," Belfer's new "policy analysis" is titled "Demographic Warfare," and aims to "falsify" "claims that Bahrain’s Shia community is underrepresented and/or excluded from the advanced elements of Bahrain’s economic life."  To this end, Belfer claims to have undertaken an extensive quantitative analysis of the sectarian demographics of dozens of public agencies and companies, namely

in four main areas of Bahrain’s economy: government (six ministries and five organisations were selected based on the number of employees), high income specialisation areas (the health sector, finance and accounting, information technologies etc), the private sector (the ten most successful companies in Bahrain were selected for investigation) and the banking sector (the five largest bank, in personnel and financial holdings, were selected for this research).

How could someone accomplish such a thing, you ask?  Using marriage certificates -- duh!  Criticizing the "bizarre techniques of unofficial 'census-taking'" (i.e., representative sampling?) employed by some researchers, Belfar explains that there is only "one way to determine (with only a small margin of error) whether a Bahraini national is an adherent of the Sunni or Shia denomination; through an inspection of marriage certificates since these are issued by the religious authorities of each denomination."  Thus, he says, he simply utilizes this previously-ignored source of provenance to determine the sectarian composition across a diverse array of Bahraini institutions.

And when I say "simply" here, that's exactly what I mean.  In fact, nowhere does Belfer describe how he actually goes from (the in principle reasonable idea of) marriage certificates to the extensive statistics he presents.  In describing his methodology he offers but a few lines:

six governmental ministries and five organisations were selected to better grasp the sectarian divide between Shia and Sunni Bahrainis. These were selected based on three main criteria: first, that they are considered key agencies for governance and national development, second that the ministries employ more than 1,000 people and the organisations employ more than 300 people so that the research is more reflective, and third, for practical reasons, there was wide access to information in these ministries and organisations.

Thus, one is led to believe that Belfer has taken random samples of employees across dozens of Bahraini companies and ministries--thousands of individuals, assuming at least a few hundred from each organization to make the sample representative--asked the selected employees in each case to bring their marriage certificates to him for inspection, and then recorded their denomination. Apart from the irony that this sort of sampling is precisely the sort of "bizarre unofficial census-taking" that Belfer dismisses in his introduction; and apart from the question of unmarried workers, one wonders at the luck of this seemingly obscure Czech-based researcher granted "wide access to information" while others are turned back at the airport for no more than uttering the name Bahrain.

The possible explanations, accordingly, would seem to be three: either his data and study are entirely fabricated; or the study was done with the explicit blessing/sponsorship of the government; or both. The latter two alternatives would help explain (setting aside the question of his previous "work") his explicit aim here of trying to "falsify" claims of discrimination against Bahraini Shi'a, which is an odd aim for an academic study. If his purpose were purely intellectual, presumably he would have aimed simply to determine the actual sectarian composition of various Bahraini agencies and industries, not to falsify any particular argument.

On the other hand, the substantive results of his analysis are, surprisingly, not surprising.  Far from it, most would seem to confirm general perceptions in Bahrain regarding the relative over-representation of Sunnis and Shi'is, respectively, across various sectors of government and the economy.  That Shi'a are, for example, over-represented in the Ministries of Health and Municipalities but under-represented in the Ministry of Finance, is quite believable and in line with popular perceptions.  Likewise, that Shi'a dominate the staff of ALBA and BAPCO but not at the airport seems far from controversial.

In fact, then, one begins to suspect that Belfer's statistics--which apart from the Justice Ministry do not include data on sovereign ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Defense, and so on, nor on the police or military--are probably real, originating perhaps from the Central Informatics Organization or some other statistical authority.   One may recall, for instance, a July 2011 Al-Jazeera report, a report the Bahraini government vociferously denied, about a claimed government study into the sectarian composition of the country.  Moreover, government cooperation would also explain how Belfer actually acquired the data, given the impossibility of his purported methodology.

Whatever the case, the purpose of the Belfer paper is clear: to counter perceptions--local but probably mainly Western perceptions--of employment discrimination against Shi'a citizens.  Of course, insofar as the main grievance of Shi'a is not simply employment discrimination per se but disproportionate exclusion from politically-important positions--indeed, from precisely those ministries (and security services) not included in Belfer's report--it does not directly address this issue.

Yet the bigger problem with the paper would seem to be one for the government itself.  That is, what exactly is the lesson here? And to whom is it directed? Though the article's main audience is obviously Western, still if I were the Bahraini government I don't know if I would want to be advertising the fact that, in reality, Shi'a citizens seem to be doing better than Sunnis in many industries and agencies. For, as my own survey results showed, the political views and behavior of ordinary Shi'a Bahrainis are not systematically related to their economic status; those of Sunnis, by contrast, are, and one would think the state would be cognizant of this.

Thanks may be in order, therefore, to Mitchell A. Belfer, who seems to have substantiated the primary complaint of many of the government's fiercest critics: that Bahraini Sunnis are poorly rewarded for their staunch support of the government, which continues to patronize exactly those who oppose it.

Update: Speaking of random "scholars" given unfettered access to Bahrain, here's one for you: Moroccan freelance journalist Souad Mekhennet, now a Nieman Fellow based at Harvard University, has apparently conducted a lengthy interview with King Hamad in Bahrain. One can infer the gist of the article from its novel title, "Terrorism Has No Religion." In any case, there must be a good story behind this.

Update 2: Perhaps we're getting closer to the mystery of Mitchell Belfer's demographic "study." Friday's edition of Akhbar al-Khaleej featured an extended treatment of his work, including a front-page blurb with the headline "Academic study from Prague University: Opposition Societies Lying [or Liars]: No economic or employment discrimination between Shi'a and Sunna in Bahrain."  This was followed by a full-page treatment in the "local news" section, which you can read below:

Update 3: An alternative theory: perhaps Mekhennet and Belfer are angling for Bahraini citizenship?  Still in London, King Hamad announces that 240 British citizens will be given Bahraini nationality. Now there's some political naturalization for you!

Update 4: Al-Wifaq is reporting that the home of Sh. 'Isa Qasim was "raided" late last night by "tens" of security officers. As far as I can recall, this marks the first time that the government has taken physical action -- threats of legal action, of course, have been numerous -- against the ranking Shi'i marja' in Bahrain. (Apparently he was not home at the time of the raid.) According to a travel warning I received yesterday from the U.S. Embassy in Manama, there were already two separate rallies planned for today, Friday: one along al-Budaiyi' Rd (i.e., not far from 'Isa Qasim's home in Diraz) and one in the Manama Suq. This newest escalation will likely only redouble the enthusiasm of demonstrators.

The Trans-Atlantic Divide in Bahrain

One might recall that in his surprise December 2012 call for renewed political talks at the Manama Dialogue, Crown Prince Salman singled out Great Britain for its support for Bahrain, telling the long-time colonial master, "You stood head and shoulders above the rest." The United States, by contrast, was not mentioned at all, an exclusion described in the media as a "snub" and taken to signal Bahrain's displeasure with the U.S.'s relative willingness to pressure its ally toward meaningful reform.

A few weeks later, when the dialogue process restarted (though not, ostensibly, as a result of Sh. Salman's urging), I wrote that this "snub" in fact should serve the dialogue process well, as it meant that there would be no confusion as to its sponsorship. The quickest way to derail any political talks in Bahrain, that is to say, is to leave open the interpretation that the United States is surreptitiously behind them. And what better way to demonstrate that such is not the case than by a public suggestion of a diplomatic spat?

More recently, however, one gets the sense that something of a diplomatic divide is indeed brewing. Yet this would seem to entail not simply a rift between the United States and Bahrain, but perhaps more importantly a growing disconnect in policy between Bahrain's two historical patrons themselves, i.e. the U.S. and Britain.  Notwithstanding the (now prior?) involvement of former Miami police chief-turned-police adviser John Timoney, still it is the British who are working closely with the Interior Ministry to help try to reform the institution.  (Incidentally, the Gulf News reports that three individuals were detained just yesterday for alleged abuses.)  Similarly, it is the British Embassy that has been coordinating closely with the sponsor of the ongoing dialogue process, Justice Minister Sh. Khalid bin 'Ali, and indeed seem to have been instrumental in setting up the process.

Not all has been smooth sailing of course -- the ongoing parliamentary inquiry into British relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is a particular sore spot -- yet the situation stands in stark contrast to Bahrain's present relations with the United States. Whereas the British Ambassador Iain Lindsay is said to golf regularly with King Hamad, the U.S. Embassy is lucky to have its calls returned at all. Last Monday, Ambassador Thomas Krajeski was, according to the BBC, "summoned" to a meeting with Foreign Minister Sh. Khalid following the publication of the State Department's annual human rights report on Bahrain.  It described "significant" continuing violations including torture in custody, as well as

"serious human rights problems," including "citizens' inability to change their government peacefully; arrest and detention of protesters on vague charges, in some cases leading to their torture in detention; and lack of due process in trials of political and human rights activists."

A yearly source of diplomatic tension (including in 2008-9 when I was in the country), the State Department's report was compounded by Bahrain's near simultaneous decision to "postpone"--that is to say cancel--a long-promised visit by a UN torture investigator.

Bahrain's opposition-less parliament has had a field day, of course, railing against the report and in particular against Ambassador Krajeski, already under parliamentary (and popular) scrutiny for his alleged secret liaisons with members of al-Wifaq on the premises of the ongoing dialogue -- not to mention his time in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Thus the following Gulf Daily News editorial from mid-April:

Indeed, if you [i.e., an American] live in Bahrain and have enjoyed your stay and would like to continue living here, can you honestly tell me what business is it of the US government to spoonfeed the so-called opposition which is nothing but a terrorist movement financed by Iran - our mutual enemy - and adopted by your government?

This very opposition is committing atrocities on a daily basis. They are killing innocent citizens and innocent foreign workers. They are killing the very symbol of security by burning policemen alive. Indeed, when was the last time you saw a person scalped? Well, you probably saw it in a Western movie, however we had a police man scalped here in Bahrain, with a brick, would you like to see his picture?

The British Ambassador had the decency to admit that this mob is nothing but a group of terrorists. British minister Alistair Burt admitted that Iran is interfering and is the direct cause of what is going on in Bahrain. Yet, he also categorically denied that Britain had anything to do with it.

On the other hand, the American Ambassador has neither condemned the violence nor denied the fact that he is indeed in constant touch with these so-called terrorists.

For the record, then, that's: American ambassador: terrorist sympathizer working for Iran; British ambassador: not a terrorist sympathizer and not an Iranian agent. Or, simply consult the following checklist:

Of course, the worrying bit is not this discrepancy in public opinion per se but the divergence in policy that underlies it.  The United States continues to pin its hopes for political resolution on the crown prince, seemingly shunning all other members of the Al Khalifa. Compare, for instance, the recent White House visits of the Qatari emir and Abu Dhabi's Muhammad bin Zayid, who met with President Obama.  By contrast, Bahrain's April 29 visit was made by the unimportant foreign minister, who was greeted only by a chiding John Kerry.

Unfortunately for U.S. policy in Bahrain, however, despite some recent success (I hear) in asserting his newfound authority within the government, Sh. Salman still is best known for his embarrassing failure in March 2011. Only when he is able to make substantive progress that ordinary citizens can see and feel -- say, by reinstating the now-suspended LMRA tax on foreign labor and reviving the employment training program that it funded -- will his political stock begin to rise.  And one can be sure that his competitors within the ruling family, along with like-minded members of society, will be working diligently to ensure that this comeback attempt does not proceed smoothly.

The British, on the other hand, are clearly reaching out to a wider range of partners within the ruling family. Beyond Britain's aforementioned cooperation with the Ministers of Interior and Justice, it has cultivated a seemingly close relationship with Bahrain's military establishment, an institution closely linked to the powerful, hard-line Khawalid faction of the ruling family.  This coordination includes bilateral trainings, exercises, high-level visits, and a new Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2012. (Incidentally, Sandhurst, where King Hamad underwent training while crown prince, recently renamed a hall in his honor -- i.e., in return for £3 million.)

Notably, this increased collaboration on military matters also means that, rather than Sh. Salman, the British have grown closer to another of King Hamad's sons, Sh. Nasr. Shaikh Nasr, known before the uprising mainly as the head of Bahrain's Olympic Committee, has risen from relative obscurity in the period since February 2011.  At the height of the security crackdown in June 2011, he was appointed Commander of the BDF Royal Guard and promoted from captain to colonel.  Around the same time, opposition activists accused him of involvement in torturing detained athletes, a reputation (ill-gotten or not) that has served to boost his image and popularity among security-minded Bahrainis.  Like his father, Shaikh Nasr attended Sandhurst, graduating in 2006. While Sh. Nasr is not an immediate threat to displace the crown prince as heir apparent, such a thing is perhaps not unimaginable, and his marriage to the daughter of the ruler of Dubai is one additional asset in this regard.

It is unlikely, however, that Britain's newfound military interest in Bahrain represents a mere hedging of bets in the event that the crown prince does not prevail in his intra-familial contest for political direction. Indeed, a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute, a British security think-tank, "suggests Britain could be slowly re-establishing a permanent, strategic military presence in the Middle East in what amounts to a rethink of the 1960’s decision to withdraw UK forces from areas 'East of Suez.'"  It continues,

[T]he UK is at a significant decision point where defence orientation towards the Gulf States is both plausible and logical. ...

The Royal Navy is ... taking a more active interest in Bahrain, which is already home to the United Kingdom Maritime Component Command (UKMCC).

“We seem to be witnessing the slow transformation in the UK military posture towards a tentative return (at this early stage) to the pre-1971 strategy of rooting Britain's presence in the southern Gulf through agreements with its traditional allies in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with outlying anchors in Bahrain and Oman, and with close political and economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that could be upgraded to the military level if necessary.”

Whatever the case, one hopes that Britain and the United States can achieve a more constructive policy coordination in Bahrain going forward. With all the internal fractures already helping to preclude resolution of Bahrain's political stalemate, the country certainly is not in need of another.

Update: Several people have written to point out the British Embassy in Bahrain's odd choice of "contributors" for a blog post on Thursday celebrating World Press Freedom Day, namely Editor-in-Chief of Akhbar al-Khaleej Anwar 'Abd al-Rahman (who in December utilized his freedom of the press to railroad a planned symposium on Bahrain organized by Brookings in Doha); and "Citizens for Bahrain," an anonymous pro-government "citizen coalition" whose main thesis is that "freedom of the press has limits."  As a friend joked, "the British Embassy may have inadvertently confused World Press Freedom Day with International Love For Censorship Day. It's easily done!"

Update 2: From a report in The Independent from late March: "[In an interview with the Gulf Daily News, Lindsay] also remarked that 'British companies should be able to pick up at least £1bn worth of business here over the next five to 10 years,' a prospect which may or may not colour his attitude to civil rights in the kingdom."

Update 3:  Al-Wasat reports (via Sameera Rajab; English here) that the Bahraini cabinet has approved a parliamentary proposal to end the U.S. Ambassador's "interference" in the country, in particular his meetings with al-Wifaq. Unless I'm mistaken, the proposal in question dates to October 2012 and was sponsored by six Islamist MPs. It's not clear what if anything this means in practice, since Rajab also stated that Bahrain "will commit to international agreements in dealing with the US ambassador," i.e. will not dismiss him.

Update 4: King Hamad and Shaikh Nasr (along with brother Khalid) back in Britain as head of Bahrain's delegation to the Royal Windsor Horse Show.

Update 5: Happy Fourth of July!

Update 6: Lots of diplomatic maneuvering these days.  According to the BNA, the Commander of U.S. CENTCOM is in Manama, having met with Sh. Salman, Khalifa bin Salman, and Khalifa bin Ahmad. The latter meeting, the BNA story makes clear, included Ambassador Krajeski.  On the other hand, Sh. Nasser and King Hamad are in London ostensibly for the Windsor Horse Show.  The former paid a visit to the newly-christened King Hamad wing at Sandhurst, while his father gave a very interesting address (see video below, around 8:15) to his British counterparts in which he asks flatly why the British ever left the Gulf in the first place, relating his father's reaction to their 1971 decision to withdraw: "Why?  Did someone ask you to go?":

Questioning Sectarianism in Bahrain and Beyond

For those interested, Jadaliyya has posted an interview conducted with me a while back on the topic of sectarianism in the Gulf region and prompted by my contribution to a forthcoming volume on the subject organized by the CIRS at Georgetown University - Qatar. (CIRS has a summary report, which I've previously posted, here.  Incidentally, I notice that CIRS has also posted a summary report for another interesting book project titled "The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East.")

The interview deals not only with my book chapter but also some more personal topics -- how I got started in the Gulf, my secret links to the U.S. government and/or Iran, etc. etc. 

Who Needs the Bahrain Grand Prix?

I have a post on the Mideast Channel today on the annual Formula One controversy titled "Who Needs the Bahrain Grand Prix?" The article, whose thesis apparently is "controversial," examines an overlooked aspect of the debate surrounding the race, namely the internal division among members of the ruling family over the wisdom and utility of hosting such an event.

In this regard it develops the paradoxical fact that the Grand Prix's longtime chief patron--and indeed perhaps its sole remaining sponsor among senior Al Khalifa--is the crown prince. His conservative competitors within the family, by contrast, in particular members of the Khawalid, would be happy to dispense with the occasion, which in their view invites only unnecessary scrutiny and a potential political pressure point.

Although it is probably unlikely to help, I would like to preemptively address the interpretation, already voiced by an early reader, that my article implies that critics of the Grand Prix ought to hold their tongues on account of the crown prince or some utilitarian political "greater good."  In fact, the piece offers no policy prescription at all but simply argues that if the race is ultimately abandoned--that is, not just this year or next, but abandoned entirely--that this will likely signal not the success of outside political pressure, but a change in internal ruling family dynamics.  And, as I conclude, the practical political implications of this turn inward and toward allies such as Saudi Arabia--of Bahrain's going off the Western political grid, so to speak, which is the preferred option of the Khawalid and other conservatives--will be most unwelcome both to the opposition movement and the international community.

Finally, a few things did not make it into the post (which initially was written as a blog post here) that are worth noting:

• First is this interesting electronic flyer from the February 14th folks announcing their "Operation: Ultimatum 3."  I'm not sure what happened with the other ultimatai, or whether they were heeded.





• A second is this equally disturbing cartoon from the Sunday Times, which unfortunately we were unable to use as the header for the post.
  
  
  


• Next is an article in Al-Watan by Faysal al-Shaykh titled "The Killing of an American Soldier in a Terrorist Bombing in Jufair." Meant presumably to be provocative and perhaps a bit threatening, it poses the hypothetical situation of a terrorist bombing at the U.S. naval base as a critique of America's ostensive support for al-Wifaq and the "terrorist" opposition. (Never mind that Sunday night's bombing like all others was carried out by the February 14th coalition.)  The tone is something like: "How would you like it if someone bombed your base?  Would you still support them then?"
  
  This editorial comes, notably, on the heals of another Al-Watan offering by Sawsan al-Sha'ir that threatened the emergence of an "al-Qa'ida in Bahrain" if the U.S. were to "attempt to enable radical Shi'a groups."

Update: Presumably just to stick it critics, Bahrain and Formula 1 are reported to be discussing a five-year extension of the Bahrain Grand Prix.

Bahrain: The "Exception" of the Arab Spring

I've been alluding recently to an article I wrote on Bahrain for the European Council on Foreign Relations.  Well, after some delay, it's finally been published along with several sister pieces on (most of) the other Gulf states.  (It seems that given the current political hysteria in the Emirates, they were unable to find a writer on that country. I'm not sure what the problem was with respect to Oman.)

The aim of the publication is to examine how Gulf publics have interpreted and reacted to the political upheaval (mostly) surrounding them since late 2010.  Fellow Dohite David Roberts has written on Qatar, blogger Ahmed al-Omran on Saudi Arabia, and Mona Kareem on Kuwait.

My contribution focuses on Bahrain as ostensive "exception" to the Arab Spring, and the domestic and regional implications of (and interests behind) this narrative. 

In short, it argues (pre-editing),

This conclusion, that “Bahrain is different” and must not be confused with the larger regional upheaval witnessed since December 2010, has emerged as the veritable mantra of those whose political interests and/or ideological orientations position them on the opposite side of the country’s ongoing struggle for reform. And its use and usefulness is not restricted to the domestic context. While influential satellite news networks such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya report on “revolutions” in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, they speak merely — and far less frequently, if at all — of “events in Bahrain” or of Bahrain’s “crisis”, a generic problem that might denote a political scandal, a natural disaster, or an acute shortage of hamour. Thus, as most other Gulf publics struggle with how to interpret and react to the Arab Spring revolts as (largely) outside observers, Bahrainis continue to be divided, and to be influenced by divisions abroad, over whether theirs rightly counts among them. ...

[B]eyond its narrow local purpose, this explanation also promotes a range of broader regional aims. In the first place, sustained accusations of Iranian sponsorship of Shi'a in Bahrain and throughout the region not only delegitimizes these groups domestically, but they also heighten feelings of insecurity among other predominantly Sunni Gulf populations, dampening their appetite for change and marshalling popular (if perhaps not elite) support for a Saudi-led project of greater politico-military integration among the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

At the same time, and even more important for Gulf monarchs, the notion of Bahraini exceptionalism helps obfuscate the larger trend of popular political mobilization evident across the region — in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia, in Oman, and in the United Arab Emirates — since the beginning of the Arab Spring. That Bahrain is merely a unique and isolated case, rather than part of a larger bottom-up push toward political reform in the most autocratic part of the Arab world, is a message that Gulf leaders are eager to sell to citizens and Western patrons alike.

Update: Remember last weekend's University of Bahrain-sponsored "Bahrain International Symposium" held to demonstrate the country's commitment to reform? Yeah, about that ...

And from the same author (Geneive Abdo): "The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide," featuring a mini-chapter on Bahrain informed by more than a dozen personal interviews.

Update 2: Since my article for ECFR discusses the contradiction between (mostly Sunni) claims of outside "interference" in Bahrain and their own material and ideological support for rebels in Syria, I suppose this is appropriate to post here.  A Syrian rebel group called the "Al-Zubair ibn al-'Ulum Battalion"--sorry, I don't know enough about the conflict there to say much about it--has issued a video statement thanking the spiritual and financial support of Bahrain's Salafis (whom one will remember visited Syria over Ramadan), in particular the parliamentary bloc al-Asalah, Sh. Jasim al-Sa'idi, and a pro-Syrian group based in Hamad Town (possibly, given the demographics of Hamad Town, naturalized Syrians?).

A (Discouraging) Window into Bahrain's National Dialogue

I'm quite busy preparing a paper for this year's GRM, so I've currently little time to write here. (Though I do have an article on Bahrain for the European Council on Foreign Relations that should be published this week.) Thankfully, G2K contributors continue to fill the gap. The following update from Mansoor al-Jamri helps elucidate what for me at least has remained a bit murky: the actual modalities, procedures, and agenda--or lack thereof--of the ongoing "dialogue" between the opposition and pro-government groups. (Don't you dare suggest that the government "mediators"/"observers" are participating in the talks!)

He concisely summarizes,

On 10 February 2013, a "dialogue" process started in Bahrain, and the participants have been meeting once or twice every week, but without real progress on any meaningful issue. The following is an attempt to describe the current situation.

1. The government insists on saying that the current process is titled "Complementing (or completing) the political dimension of the National Consensus Dialogue". This is to say that this exercise is linked to the "National Consensus Dialogue" that was organized after the state of emergency in July 2011.
2. The government rejects the descriptions used by the opposition, specifically that this is not a "dialogue" and it is nothing to do with "negotiations".
3. The government rejects any talk that this is a dialogue between the government and the opposition, and insists that this is a dialogue between the "constituents of the society", i.e. between the Shia and the Sunnis. The government says it is a "Coordinator" in the process, and any point must be agreed on by "all parties" to be considered valid.
4. The government says that the outcome of the exercise will be summarized and handed over to the King (to be introduced later through the current parliamentary process). The opposition rejects this idea, and insists that the outcome must be submitted to a referendum.
5. The sessions are held in Al-Areen Resort, south of Bahrain, near the Formula 1 race circuit. Each participant is allowed to speak for 5 minutes in rotation.
6. The participants are 27 people, 19 of whom are linked to the government and 8 are from the opposition, as follows:
   
   • 3 ministers (1 from the ruling Al-Khalifa family [i.e., the Justice Minister], who is also the administrator of the sessions, 1 Sunni, 1 Shia)
   • 8 parliamentarians (4 from the appointed Shura Council and 4 from the House of Representatives).
   • 8 from the Sunni loyalist political groups.
   • 8 from the opposition groups (2 from Al-Wefaq, 2 from Waad, etc.).
   • The opposition delegation is made up of Shias and Sunnis, and includes 2 women.
7. Up until today (29 March 2013), a total of nine sessions were held. All the sessions have been deliberating on the MECHANISM, and nothing yet has been agreed on. Specifics are as follows:
   
   • The opposition wants a representative from the King to attend the sessions. This is totally rejected up until now. [See, e.g., here.]
   • The opposition wants the results of the talks to be presented to the public for a referendum. This is also rejected.
   • The opposition wants to participate in appointing 4 independent candidates to replace 4 from the parliamentarians. This is also rejected. [On this, see this recent Gulf News article.]
   • The opposition wants to agree on the formation of an implementation committee to be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the results. This is not yet agreed on.
   • The opposition wants to have a timetable for this process. This is rejected.
   • The government wants to delay talking about the MECHANISM and to go to the issues on the agenda. The opposition says an agreement must first be reached on the MECHANISM.

Finally, one must note the ongoing legal controversy surrounding al-Wifaq for its recent lawsuit filed against Minister of State for Crazy Affairs Sameera Rajab, whom it accuses of "defaming" the society in comments published in March in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and later carried in the BNA.  In (a very mature) response, the Ministry of Municipalities filed similar suit against one of al-Wifaq's representatives in the dialogue, Majeed Milad, for comments he made in an interview regarding the state's demolition of Shi'a mosques. According to al-Wifaq, some in the government are attempting to force (or provoke) its exit from the dialogue.

Update: An update from Mansoor:

By now, the 27 people taking part in Bahrain's "National Consensus Dialogue" have completed about two months of heated discussions without breaking through the deadlock. However, something new could be emerging out of the latest session held on 7 April 2013, when the participants talked about several issues and realized that the lack of progress to date relates to the fact that there is no confidence between the government and opposition and that, for any success to be achieved, confidence-building measures must be implemented.

Ahead of the session 7 April, the government issued a statement, through the Information Affairs Authority (IAA), saying that "the Cabinet confirmed that as per the government's responsibility and participation in the National Consensus Dialogue, the Government is keen on moving forward with the agendas core topics in an aim to achieve consensus in terms of political development."

By this statement the government wanted to block the opposition's insistence on continuing to debate several key issues pertaining to the "mechanism" for dialogue, specifically the opposition's demand that a King's representative ought to attend the session, and that the outcome of the dialogue must be presented for a referendum to gain popular legitimacy.

With regard to the demand for a referendum, the IAA said in its statement, "The cabinet further confirmed that the real guarantee for development and reform is to work within the state institutions, and to respect the legislative and constitutional laws that form the road map for any person seeking progress and development in the Kingdom." This means the cabinet rejects the idea of the referendum.

However, members of the opposition participating in the dialogue process issued a counter-statement reaffirming their “adherence to serious national dialogue leading to an outcome that takes Bahrain out of the bottleneck,”. More specifically, the statement said that “the opposition rejects any dictates to be imposed through official press statement, from outside the dialogue table,” and that the opposition insists on agreeing on the “mechanism” first before moving to the agenda of issues.

The opposition has a concern based on previous experience that unless a mechanism is established, then things will be wrapped up, summarized in points, tweaked to suit those in power, and enforced. ...

During the session of 7 April 2013, it became evident that there is currently no confidence between the government and opposition, and to achieve real progress, confidence-building measure must be implemented to pave the way for meaningful deliberations.

Update 2: The Gulf Daily News reports that pro-government groups, including members of parliament, are accusing the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain of collaboration with al-Wifaq in the national dialogue:

"This diplomat [the U.S. ambassador] has crossed all red lines as he runs the National Dialogue, distributes letters and recommendations in English to participants, according to evidence we have.

"We don't want a statement being issued by parliament condemning his interference, a strong decision has to be taken by MPs and sent to the government to stop this man from further damaging the nation."

Mr Al Dossary's comments follow allegations on Sunday by MP and dialogue participant Latifa Al Gaoud that a key opposition document submitted to the talks had been drafted in English before being translated into Arabic.

Ms Al Gaoud, who is a member of the National Independent Bloc, said some of the words had not even been translated into Arabic and suggested the document had been drawn up with help from the US Embassy.

Mr Krajeski caused anger last month when he was spotted at the National Dialogue venue on the same day that a session of the talks was taking place.

He was seen leaving just moments before talks were due to start, but a US Embassy spokesman claimed he was there for a private meeting and did not meet dialogue participants.

Among those also seen at the meeting attended by the ambassador was editor-in-chief of opposition newspaper Al Wasat Dr Mansoor Al Jamri.

A New U.S. Policy in Bahrain?

The following is an interesting and perceptive view posted today to the Gulf2K mailing list by Georgetown University's Jean-Francois Seznec, who agreed to let me post it here:

A few small facts and rumors may be pointing to a faint ray of hope at the end of a long tunnel in Bahrain.

1. One of the Royal family members broke the rule of silence within the Al Khalifas in Bahrain and spoke to the Wall Street Journal of the rift in the family between the liberals and the “khawalites”. Although, there have been calls in the family to investigate to find out who this Sheikh may be, nothing has happened to this person, at least not yet. Furthermore, the more liberal Crown Prince has been promoted to Deputy PM.
2. Sheikh Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa, the Bahraini Minister of Justice was reported by the Kuwait News Agency to have announced a delay in the talks with the opposition on power sharing. The delay is certain, but the words “power sharing” are quite new and speak volumes ...
3. At the same time, major changes have taken place in Saudi Arabia with Prince Muqrin bin AbdelAziz getting a major leg up to be the next in line after the very ill Prince Salman. Prince Muqrin is thought to be very close to King Abdullah and often seen to be quite liberal on social and economic issues. He is well educated and traveled.
4. One observer mentioned on G2K and elsewhere that Prince Mita’eb bin Abdullah of Saudi Arabia sent his chief of staff to push the Bahraini leadership into accommodating some of the opposition’s demand.
5. For the past few months there has been a mounting campaign in Washington by various NGOs, think tanks and within the diplomacy and the defense establishment to close the Navy base in Bahrain. The topic is hotly debated and arguments go from “the closure is impossible” to “it would be quite feasible”. Rightly or wrongly, it seems that the pro-closure arguments seem to be winning the day.
6. It appears that the relationship between the US and the Bahraini authorities are at an all time low. There are credible rumors that the US Ambassador’s and the Navy base Admiral’s calls to the higher levels in Bahrain are not returned.

Taking all these facts together leads me to believe that the US has finally found a handle to influence the Bahraini Royal Family extremists, mentioned in the Wall Street Journal. This group, which has ruthlessly played the sectarian card, did manage to split the country and in a sense has made the majority of the population become highly susceptible to Iranian mingling. This may have been acceptable to the more conservative Saudis, but undoubtedly has gone against the previous policies of King Abdullah to make Islam in Saudi Arabia and in the Arab world inclusive of all sects and tendencies, where both Sunni’s and Shi’a can live in good intelligence.

The intervention in Bahrain by the Saudis and UAE took place at a time when King Abdullah was very ill. When he was not available to make policy in the early part of 2011, it seems that the Bahraini extremists made their case to the more conservative elements of the Saudi Royal family and won the day, getting the Saudis to make a strong gesture of support to the Al Khalifas in Bahrain and against any power sharing arrangement with the Shi’a opposition.

The facts/rumors mentioned above show that things might be changing. Most important, King Abdullah has been able to regain some strength. Many of his clear-cut decisions of the past few months show that he wants to establish his legacy on a strong footing. His push for including women in the Majlis asShura, the nomination of younger princes in position of power, and the naming of Prince Muqrin as Second Deputy PM are important. It seems, now, that he has put one of his sons in charge of the Bahrain policy, which could lead to an accommodation between the more reasonable elements of the Shi’a opposition in Bahrain and the more reasonable elements within the Al Khalifas, thereby shunting the "khawalites".

Also, the strong rumor of the US closing the large Navy base, which may be music to the ears of the Al Khalifa extremists, must be worrying the Saudis. It may be worth remembering that the base was not established in Bahrain to protect the Al Khalifas. It is there to defend Saudi Arabia. It was developed at the behest of the Saudis not the Bahrainis. Saudi Arabia cares greatly to have the base there as first line of defense against Iran. Should we close the base, transfer the command to the Qatar Air Base, the ships at sea and send a few thousand men/women back home, it will be perceived in the Gulf as weakening the Saudi defenses and the Saudi Royal Family.

Thus, it would appear that the Saudis must push the Al Khalifas to abandon their policy of squashing the Shi’a majority to protect their own parochial interest. The Saudis would be motivated by the desire to limit the appeal of Iran on the Arab Shi’a of Bahrain and by the need to ensure that the US base stays in Bahrain. One can surmise that Prince Muqrin, a popular prince in the Kingdom and a man highly respected for his intellect in the West, and Prince Mita’eb a younger but also respected royal may have decided to implement a policy of pushing their poor royal cousins in Manama to come up with solutions to the crisis that go beyond hiring expensive PR consultants in Washington.

Another way and more US centric view of the situation is that finally, the US may have found a handle on pushing for change in Bahrain. By truly and credibly looking into the base closing, Washington can influence the Saudis to impose a credible change in Bahrain without having to negotiate with the unreliable and ideological Bahraini royal extremists. Should this be the case and should it work, it would show that the US diplomacy is more sophisticated than often given credit for.

And my response:

A few notes on what is a very perceptive analysis by Jean-Francois Seznec.

1. It is widely assumed (and, having spoken at length to the author of the WSJ piece, I think the assumption is warranted) that the "leak" behind the story on Al Khalifa factionalism came from the crown prince's court, perhaps even Sh. Salman himself. That nothing has happened to the offending party may thus owe to his (official, at least) seniority vis-a-vis those behind the rumored "internal investigations," presumably the royal court minister and others among the Khawalid. Some even see the crown prince's surprise appointment to the position of "first deputy" PM in this light, i.e. as a reaffirmation of his authority against potential challengers. Of course, this interpretation raises questions of its own.
2. The oft-cited distinction between well-intended "liberals" such as King Hamad and his son and obstructionist "conservatives," especially as it relates to the Khawalid, is not so clear as it might seem. As I describe in a forthcoming (June) article in the Journal of Arabian Studies, not only has the rise to power of the Khawalid branch of the Al Khalifa occurred exclusively under the reign of King Hamad, probably as a maneuver against his more powerful uncle the prime minister, but the Khawalid--among whom are the royal court minister, the defense minister, and the justice minister charged now with overseeing the ongoing national dialogue--continue to represent the king's closest advisers and in the former two cases personal friends of many decades. Thus, notwithstanding the clear anti-Shi'a orientations of the Khawalid and their role in creating and prolonging the post-uprising crisis, the notion that Bahrain's otherwise moderate rulers are being held hostage by this conservative faction is more than a bit problematic and, as critics often point out, smells of "good cop, bad cop."
3. Unless one has considerable faith in the coercive ability both of al-Wifaq and the Bahraini government, the question still remains how any potential deal will be sold to the large proportion of Shi'is and, importantly, Sunnis who would reject any political compromise, whether because it disgraces the memory of the martyrs or, alternatively, constitutes an appeasement of terrorists. One must recall here that, independent of possible support from conservatives in Saudi Arabia, much of the power of the Khawalid, and the main reason they have achieved a level of influence disproportionate to their seniority in the ruling family, lies in their ability to mobilize Sunni public opinion--via inflammatory media such as the hard-line daily Al-Watan and direct sponsorship of Sunni groups--against the Shi'a-dominated opposition qua ostensive Iranian-backed fifth column. These networks, and the extreme political views they continue to sow, will not be undone easily. [On this see Update below.]
4. Even as U.S.-Bahraini relations appear strained as a result perhaps of American pressure for substantive political progress, the British continue to move in the opposite direction. What will be the net effect? 

In the end, of course, the pressure point must be Saudi Arabia rather than Bahrain, where Seznec rightly points out inward-looking Al Khalifa will be happy to do away not only with the Fifth Fleet but the Formula 1 race and every other institution that invites foreign scrutiny and "interference." So, as I am no expert on royal politics there, I will simply hope that the positive indications mentioned do indeed suggest a shift in Saudi policy born of self-interest.

Update: Perhaps in view of a percieved change in the U.S. stance on Bahrain, earlier this week Sawsan al-Sha'ir threatened in Al-Watan the emergence of an "al-Qa'ida" in Bahrain if the U.S. were to "attempt to enable radical Shi'a groups" such as the dastardly al-Wifaq. See point 3 of my response above.

Update 2: Speaking of U.S. policy on Bahrain, a friend notes this "international symposium" opening today in Bahrain featuring U.S. congressmen, British parliamentarians, John Bolton, John Bolton's mustache, and others. According to its website, the event "intends to examine institutional developments and political reforms in Bahrain. It will further examine the challenges of empowering diverse coalitions for democratic transition and stability in light of the geopolitics of the region." Translation: the symposium will explain why, due to the threat from Iran, Bahrain must balance reform with the need to avoid "empowering" non-"diverse coalitions" (sectarian groups) like the present Bahraini opposition.

Ostensibly sponsored by the University of Bahrain and the Bahrain-American Council, I am told the symposium is in fact but another project of the "think-tank" Derasat and its chairman Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghaffar.  Evidently my invitation was misplaced.

Update 3: This "article" in the Arab News should give you some flavor of the Bahrain International Symposium.